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Introduction 
In this article I have two related aims. First, I will outline a stream or 
constellation of contemporary French medical humanism which defines itself 
in part through a critical relation to René Descartes. Elsewhere I have used the 
term “humanism” as “an umbrella term designating any and all philosophical 
positions and discourses that elevate the human as such to an orienting 
ethical/conceptual/historical principle.”1 I will abide by this definition 
herein. By "medical humanism" I therefore mean a derivative orientation in 
philosophical thought that is centered on human health, healing, and norms 
of humane medical practice (where “human" and “humane” must be 
understood according to a scope of inclusion which, as I will explain below, 
is problematic and which varies in different historical epochs).  
Second, I will argue that the specific stream of contemporary French 
medical humanism thus identified, to the extent that it defines itself by 
opposition to certain pernicious aspects of the Cartesian heritage, occludes 
and leaves unthought some of its deeper resonances with the latter that may 
be plausibly identified. Put simply, the stream of medical humanism that I 
will discuss is in at least one sense more Cartesian than its exemplars would 
seem to allow. Arguably this largely un-avowed Cartesianism is a reason why 
they repeat in their own way certain philosophical prejudices and court 
paradox when faced with the conceptual problems and clinical realities of 
both “marginal” human persons and human non-persons on the one hand 
(fetuses, very young children, the irremediably unconscious, advanced 
dementia patients, the severely intellectually disabled) and non-human 
persons on the other (highly plausible cases would include apes, elephants, 
corvids, cetaceans, pigs, and and other animals considered to be cognitively 
sophisticated on average human norms.). Having made the connection, I will 
show how the medical humanism under discussion indeed makes a 
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considerable advance on its classical Cartesian form – specifically, in its 
resistance to the mechanistic materialist and iatric implications which appear 
to follow from the latter. But it falls short in other important ways, and this 
invites us to consider whether it or any form of humanism - or rather, 
something like a medical personism - would be preferable.  
To achieve these objectives, I will first provide some necessary context for 
the stream of medical humanism under discussion, showing its importance 
and outlining the problem to which it offers itself as a solution. Next, I will 
show why Descartes could be considered a foundational medical humanist as 
I’ve defined the term. Then, I will reconstruct the contemporary French 
humanistic criticism of Descartes and outline the drift into mechanistic 
materialism and medicalization which followed from his work, 
notwithstanding his stated humanism. Here I will take the work of 
psychoanalyst Roland Gori and respiratory specialist and psychoanalyst 
Marie-José Del Volgo as exemplary. Since Gori and Del Volgo identify 
medicalization as a primary problem stemming from the Cartesian revolution 
in philosophy, and since they define their work as a recovery of humane 
therapeutic as opposed to narrowly iatric practice, their work is an 
appropriate and important reference. But I will also show how the solution 
adopted by Gori and Del Volgo – one that is indelibly linked to the creative 
aspect of everyday human language use – is still deeply embedded in the 
Cartesian picture. Here I will draw a comparison with two other 
contemporary French thinkers with broadly similar interests and concerns – 
specifically, Élisabeth Roudinseco (who develops her medical humanism 
along lines very similar to those of Gori and Del Volgo) and Paul Ricoeur (who 
is more tangentially related, but whose arguably Cartesian approach is 
suggestive of further research to flesh out the constellation I am sketching 
here). This will permit me to give credence to the idea of a broader 
contemporary medical humanist stream or constellation influenced by 
Descartes, while retaining Gori and Del Volgo as key interlocutors. I will 
conclude by commenting upon the problematic nature of the Cartesian 
heritage, as evidenced by all four thinkers, and suggest the most general 
outlines of a way forward.  
Context: Worries over Medicalization and the Status of 
Psychoanalysis as Medicine 
The stream of contemporary French medical humanism under discussion 
is advanced a) as a means of conceiving resistance to medicalization and of 
recovering a truly therapeutic approach to healing; and b) polemically, and 
apparently in a secondary fashion, to defend the status of psychoanalysis 
and/or other psychotherapies as legitimate forms of medicine, in a context 
where universal healthcare is provided through a system of national health 
insurance. To this extent, the two main worries of the medical humanism 
under discussion are enormously consequential and widely discussed 
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problems for philosophy, public health, and public policy in middle and 
upper-income countries.2  
Starting with the second point, contemporary French medical 
humanism’s main figures tend to have some combination of training, clinical 
experience, and/or historical and philosophical interest in psychoanalysis. 
This is not accidental since, as I will suggest below, Freud’s innovation was to 
buck a largely reductionist psychiatric approach to mental complaints and 
illnesses by underscoring the importance of the patient’s speech (broadly 
construed) in the therapeutic context. But in France in particular, where the 
state oversees and regulates the treatment of mental illnesses, the status of 
psychoanalysis and other psychotherapies as medicine has been contested 
and politicized, sparking sharp polemical exchanges. Gori and Del Volgo3 and 
Roudinesco4 in particular have written at length to defend psychoanalysis 
from its detractors and in doing so have repeatedly used its apparently 
constitutive humanistic qualities as a selling-point.  
Regarding the first and more substantial point, the claim made by Gori, 
Del Volgo and Roudinesco is that a) for instrumental and financial reasons, 
problems of everyday life are increasingly reclassified as medical problems 
(“medicalization”), and b) medical problems are classified as (ultimately) 
physiological problems (“iatric” as opposed to broadly “therapeutic” issues). 
This claim can benefit from a clarification of the terms “medicalization,” 
“iatric,” and “therapeutic.”  
“Medicalization” 
There are precedents in French philosophy, notably Georges 
Canguilhem,5 for the concept of medicalization which was popularized in the 
mid-to-late 20th Century by countercultural Anglophone writers like Ivan 
Illich6 and Thomas Szasz.7 “Medicalization” denotes an ongoing modern 
cultural and economic shift in which a) descriptively normal aspects of the 
human condition are treated as pathologies requiring medical interventions, 
b) humanity and human health are reduced, at the conceptual level, to a set 
of technical medical problems and a source of capital accumulation, and c) 
new iatrogenic or medicine-caused illnesses and injuries appear and multiply.  
First, medicalization entails that more or less descriptively normal 
aspects of the human condition – many of which involve suffering, but some 
of which arguably do not – should be treated as pathologies. This fuels a 
perceived need for increasingly sophisticated expert medical intervention. For 
example, Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English detail the process by which 
statistically normal phenomena in biologically female persons like pregnancy, 
childbirth and postpartum recovery were historically recast as diseases by the 
burgeoning medical establishment in the Global North.8 Thus construed, 
biologically female bodies and their normal reproductive processes came 
increasingly under expert control and observation. Notably, this 
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medicalization of normatively female reproductive power was accompanied 
by a legal and medical campaign against the practice of midwifery, a woman-
centric, woman-empowering practice which is now regaining traction after 
more than a century of persecution.9 To take a second example, witness the 
American Psychiatric Association’s controversial inclusion of so-called 
“Oppositional-Defiant Disorder” or ODD – effectively, protracted childhood 
acting-out, attributable to no specific aetiology but correlated with risk factors 
like insecure parental attachment and an unstable home environment – in its 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.10 While it is 
understandable that insecure attachment and disadvantaging environmental 
factors may lead to individual suffering and interpersonal issues11 it is less 
obvious that these should be classed as “psychiatric” rather than familial or 
societal problems. Hence, the phenomenon is arguably “medicalized.” As the 
two examples suggest, different areas of medicine – obstetrics and psychiatry, 
respectively – have penetrated, though not without resistance, into the 
tribulations of the human condition, if not everyday human life.  
Second, medicalization implies that humanity and human health are 
increasingly reduced, at the conceptual level, to a set of technical medical 
problems and a potential source of capital accumulation. In this connection, 
and lest the concept of medicalization be dismissed on account of its 
countercultural pedigree, it is worthwhile to emphasize its philosophical 
roots. The critique of medicalization as noted is traceable to Canguilhem but 
can also be brought under the umbrella of a wider critique of instrumental 
rationality or “technoscience” pioneered by Martin Heidegger on the right,12 
and the Frankfurt School on the left;13 in fact, both of these color Gori and Del 
Volgo’s account. According to its most vigorous critics but also its most 
staunch defenders – think here of the Lyotard-Habermas debate for example14 
– modernity is out of joint. More precisely, since the advent of historical 
modernity we approximate less and less the philosophically modern, 
Schillerian ideal of a well-balanced, facultary human subjectivity. In its place, 
the strictly instrumental or practical-pragmatic dimension of reason holds 
sway. But since the instrumental is only one aspect of human rationality, life 
under its hegemony becomes less and less human, and less and less humane. 
Robustly philosophical questions about the human good and about human 
flourishing are increasingly reduced to technical problems and market 
imperatives. Medicalization is one symptom of such a shift, but there are 
many others.15 What such symptoms have in common is that they index a 
shift away from human goods and flourishing to efficiency, technical 
development and optimal performance. Or at least, they indicate that human 
goods and flourishing have become means to these ends. In this connection, 
one of the arguments of Gori and Del Volgo’s La Santé totalitaire is that good 
health and fitness are increasingly cast as civic and economic duties for 
modern individuals. Under such conditions, medicine participates with 
public health and health promotion in a positively totalitarian endeavor. 
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Third and finally, medicalization has meant the appearance of iatrogenic 
or medicine-based injuries and illnesses. These in turn create a perceived need 
for further medical interventions. The aforementioned medicalization of 
childbirth is a case in point, since in the process of a given low-risk childbirth, 
early intervention may lead to an invasive if not injurious cascade of further 
interventions.16 But many other examples could also serve here; consider the 
stigma, trauma and institutionalization which can follow from a medicalized 
approach to some of what are considered to be mental illnesses.17 Or finally, 
consider the current opioid crisis in North America, in which the tendency to 
over-prescribe and incorrectly prescribe for pain are apparently significant 
factors.18   
“Iatric” vs. “Therapeutic” 
It is important to underscore that the medicalization which concerns 
writers in the contemporary French medical humanism under discussion is a 
narrowly iatric, that is, medico-physiological approach to human health and 
healing. (I happen to believe that we are also in the midst of a distinct but 
similarly troubling “therapeutic medicalization” wherein a pseudo-scientific 
and quasi-magical concept of “wellness” is vying for hegemony over 
everyday life from a different angle – but this is a discussion for another time.) 
Gori and Del Volgo describe the difference between the narrowly iatric 
and the genuinely therapeutic as follows: “La pratique iatrique s’applique au 
corps et relève de la medicine alors que la therapeutique est beaucoup plus 
large, elle soigne l’âme comme les medicins soignent les corps et elle est vouée 
à une pratique du culte de l’être.”19 The iatric would be, on this 
understanding, a case or a specialization of the therapeutic which is narrowly 
centred on the anatomy, physiology, and descriptively normal functioning of 
the human body. The therapeutic itself is much broader and involves human 
illness and wellness in their various other dimensions. Crucial to the 
therapeutic is what, following Georges Canguilhem, Gori and Del Volgo 
variously call “la maladie du malade” that is radically distinct from the 
medical construction of the illness,20  or “la souffrance dans la souffrance”21 
or “la douleur du malade.”22 What they are evoking is pain and suffering in 
all its subjective complexity, as opposed to the malfunctioning of the human 
body. As they describe it, an illness exceeds the patient’s subjectivity – it 
outstrips it because it intimately undermines the patient qua speaking subject, 
it cannot be grasped or fully communicated – but the subjectivity of the 
patient in turn exceeds the medical situation as currently conceived and 
structured.23 Hence, medicine is not just a matter of physical tinkering, but 
implies a subjective working-through (in Freud’s sense) in which the patient 
must struggle to put her suffering into language, in a situation in which she 
is at a remove from both herself (through the intrusion of the symptom into 
the psychic economy) and the medical practitioner (through the 
phenomenological and ethical encounter with the other that this implies). 
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Healing, for Gori and Del Volgo, ultimately involves wresting one’s life away 
from a medically determined script or fate and reestablishing a relation of 
incertitude towards one’s own future – but paradoxically, this struggle 
usually occurs intersubjectively, in collaboration with a professional or 
professionals who are most often strangers and therefore healing demands an 
unprecedented relation of ethical openness, solicitude, and trust.24 Perhaps 
one of the greatest and most sophisticated contemporary French accounts of 
this subjective struggle in the medical situation is Jean-Luc Nancy’s short 
memoir L’Intrus,25 to which Gori and Del Volgo devote several pages. As 
Nancy’s testimony suggests, the medical situation is eminently ethical – in its 
transcendental structure, if not always in practice – and Gori and Del Volgo 
never tire of hammering this point home.  
Such an emphasis in Gori and Del Volgo on what exceeds the scope of 
how the medical situation is usually conceived and structured, coupled with 
invocations of ritual practices or approaches to being, might appear however 
on first blush to imply a form of magical healing that is suggestive of new age 
spiritualism, or idealism, or metaphysical dualism. But Gori and Del Volgo 
insist that this is not the case; in fact, they maintain that even ancient 
materialist physicians understood the holistic nature of healing and put the 
irreducibly subjective dimension that is implied by human suffering into their 
medical practice.26 According to Gori and Del Volgo, however, the iatric has 
unfortunately colonized the entire field of healing in our age, and it is against 
this state of affairs that they repeatedly militate.27 
When Gori and Del Volgo and their contemporaries complain of 
“medicalization”, they therefore largely refer to the colonization of everyday 
life by an iatric, i.e. medico-physiological model of health and healing. The 
resistance to medicalization takes a variety of forms, from the overtly magical, 
to the paranoid, to the skeptical, to the more scientific. For their part, Gori and 
Del Volgo claim to offer a scientifically informed resistance that insists upon 
the dignity of humanity and on the specificity of human suffering. Their 
medical humanism largely accepts modern medical progress but resists the 
inhumanity and exploitative character of scientific medicine’s instrumental 
logic. In an effort to protest the misinterpretation of their work as reactionary 
or anti-science, they even go so far as to claim themselves the heritors of 
Enlightenment philosophy.28  
Cartesian Medical Humanism  
Having described the medicalization which worries contemporary 
French thinkers like Gori and Del Volgo, I will now add historical depth to 
my account of their humanist position. Recall that “medical humanism”, as I 
have defined it, denotes an orientation in philosophical thought that is centred 
on human health, healing and the derivative value of humane medical 
practice. Thus defined, a good case can be made that medical humanism 
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forms the cornerstone of Descartes’s rhetorical defense of his revolutionary 
scientific enterprise, as presented in the Discourse on Method.  
The rhetoric of the Discourse is markedly humanistic. For example, 
Descartes invokes “the law that obliges us to procure, as much as is in our 
power, the common good of all men.”29 But he makes the link to medicine 
explicit and decisive for his project when he claims that: 
“…it is possible to arrive at knowledge that would be very 
useful in life and that, in place of that speculative 
philosophy taught in the schools, it is possible to find a 
practical philosophy … [which would] render ourselves, as 
it were, masters and possessors of nature. This is desirable 
not only for the invention of an infinity of devices that 
would enable one to enjoy trouble-free the fruits of the 
earth and all the goods found there, but also principally for 
the maintenance of health, which unquestionably is the first 
good and the foundation of all the other goods of this life; 
for even the mind depends so greatly on the disposition of 
the organs of the body that, if it is possible to find some 
means to render men generally more wise and more adroit 
than they have been up until now, I believe that one should 
look for it in medicine. It is true that the medicine currently 
practiced contains few things whose usefulness is so 
noteworthy; but without intending to ridicule it, I am sure 
there is no one, not even among those who make a 
profession of it, who would not admit that everything 
known in medicine is practically nothing in comparison 
with what remains to be known, and that one could rid 
oneself of an infinity of maladies, as much of the body as of 
the mind, and even perhaps also the frailty of old age, if one 
had a sufficient knowledge of their causes and of all the 
remedies that nature has provided us. For, [I have] the 
intention of spending my entire life in the search for so 
indispensable a science, and [have] found a path that seems 
to me such that, by following it, one ought infallibly to find 
this science, unless one is prevented from doing so either 
by the brevity of life or by a lack of experiments . . .”30 
In this vein, Descartes closes the Discourse by resolving to spend the rest of his 
life “on nothing but trying to acquire some knowledge of nature which is such 
that one could draw from it rules for medicine that are more reliable than 
those we have at present.”31  
Descartes was writing in a dangerous time and had legitimate fears of 
persecution on account of his scientific work and writings. It is therefore 
crucial to read the Discourse both in terms of its methodological and its 
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propagandistic dimensions. Descartes is no doubt revolutionizing science and 
philosophy but he is also pleading the social utility of his research as a 
bulwark against censorship or worse. There is no obvious reason however to 
doubt the Discourse’s importance as a work of medical humanism, even if the 
latter is serving a rhetorical function – at least if we take “Descartes” as the 
name of a systemic revolution in science and philosophy in which the 
Discourse plays a key part (other entries in the Cartesian corpus bolster the 
medical humanism interpretation; in The Principles of Philosophy, for example, 
Descartes claims that medicine is one of the principal branches of philosophy, 
along with mechanics and morals).32  
Note however that the problem of the scope of inclusion in the moral 
community, which I will argue is implicit in any humanism, is already 
expressed in the long passage quoted above. Descartes expresses not just his 
commitment to improving the health of humans as he finds them but also to 
improving humans themselves – to make them “generally more wise and 
more adroit than they have been up until now.” Thus while his humanism is 
readily apparent, one may question to what extent Descartes opens the door 
to an exclusionary and normative conception of humanity.  
The First Cartesian Moment: Banishing Subjectivity and 
Intersubjectivity from Medicine 
The problem, for later critics like Gori and Del Volgo, is that whatever 
may be said about the humanism of its rhetorical and public face in the 
Discourse – and indeed, whatever may be said about its author’s intentions – 
the Cartesian system de facto mechanizes the human body, largely and 
erroneously reduces mental illness and suffering to physiological 
malfunction, and thereby promotes, implicitly, an iatric as opposed to a 
genuinely therapeutic, humane and holistic, vision of medicine and healing. 
In this sense, Cartesianism amounts to a “humanism” that actually tends to 
promote an inhuman vision of human beings and an injurious model of 
medicine.  
The claim then is that notwithstanding his stated humanism, Descartes 
played a significant if not foundational philosophical role in the colonization 
of the therapeutic by the iatric. It is well known that he systematized the 
longstanding conceptual division between soul and body, or between subject 
and object, which has proven so problematic if not untenable in matters 
medical, environmental and political. There is in fact a profound irony 
permeating his work, since he elevates one aspect of the human spirit, reason, 
to a special if not dignified status while casting the human body as a 
physiological machine, desacralized and subject to infinite analytical parsing, 
control and manipulation. From here, as Gori and Del Volgo argue, it’s a short 
step to the mechanistic materialism of Julien Offray de La Mettrie and later to 
Xavier Bichat, who would indeed look no further than the machine and, 
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perhaps even more tellingly, the cadaver, in order to define “Man”.33 
Defenders of holism in health will therefore readily recognize the danger in 
Descartes’s gesture: despite his protestations and promissory notes he de facto 
conceives of humanity’s essence (and implicitly its goods) as lying entirely 
outside of the scope of science, while at the same time explicitly pushing 
medical science ahead for expressly humanistic reasons. True humanity is 
thus invisible to the medicine that nominally serves it, at least to the extent 
that the medical arts can only strive for technoscientific mastery. But 
humanity thus rendered invisible, the risk is that medicine itself will become 
inhuman.  
It is at this crucial part of their analysis that Gori and Del Volgo appear 
to cleave to the Foucauldian story about Descartes. According to this story, 
Descartes essentially reduces human subjectivity to a transcendental 
condition of truth, understood as correctness or adequacy. As Gori and Del 
Volgo tell it (following Foucault in his 1981-82 seminar), there is a modern 
“Cartesian moment” wherein truth is recast as the exactitude of 
representation and its verification; and since truth thus construed has no need 
of it, the knowing subject is banished from theoretical and applied 
knowledge.34 In this way, Descartes (or, if we wish to be more consistently 
Foucauldian, the historical process which accretes around the proper name) 
casts the core of humanity as the vanishing point of the rational subject and 
places the thickness and complexity of the real psychological person into the 
orbit of mechanistic and thus iatric healing. But this renders all therapeutic, 
narrative tellings of the “suffering of the sufferer” reducible to a material 
account, corpuscular or otherwise, where of necessity, the quality of suffering 
disappears. Under such conditions, “la recherche du vrai prévaut sur le souci 
du bien.”35 The Cartesian moment, significantly, also seems thereby to imply 
a perception of either the futility or the redundancy of non-iatric methods like 
psychoanalysis.  
To see more precisely still how all of this happens, consider first the 
evidence provided by Descartes’s own work in physiology. The Treatise of 
Man is, effectively, a treatise on a machine – even though Descartes, famously, 
postulated the seemingly inexplicable interaction of res extensa, matter, with 
res cogitans, the rational soul, in conceiving of the human. For rhetorical and 
political reasons, Descartes claims in the opening of the Treatise that he will be 
describing not real humans therein, but rather hypothetical men created by 
God. The typical body of such men he conceptualizes as “a statue, an earthen 
machine.”36 Note that in the later text Description of the Body, Descartes drops 
this pretense and describes real human beings in much the same terms.37 But 
at no point does he seem to suggest that the mechanistic nature of the body 
implies the inexistence of the rational soul. He is in fact rather explicit about 
God’s role in “join[ing] a rational soul to this machine.”38 The whittling down 
of the soul to bare reason, rather than its complete denial, is rather what is at 
issue. But since this gives almost the entirety of the human being over to 
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mechanism, this gesture is already revolutionary, and it is a decisive step 
towards an iatric approach even where large swaths of psychological 
medicine are concerned.  
Specifically, it is remarkable that in both texts, it is always a question of 
rendering the soul surprisingly passive in the face of nature’s mechanical 
forces, and of reducing as many of its purported powers as possible to 
mechanistic physiological explanation. As translator Thomas Steele Hall 
comments, “In certain ways, the heart of Descartes’s endeavor, after he had 
split reality into material and mental components, was to ascribe as much as 
possible – ideas included – to the former, that is, to res extensa rather than res 
cogitans.”39 Exemplary here is the text’s discussion of memory. As Descartes 
puts it, “the effect of memory that seems to me the most worthy of 
consideration … consists in [the fact] that without there being any soul in this 
machine it can be naturally disposed to imitate all movements that real men 
(or many other, similar machines) will make when the soul is present.”40 It is 
true that throughout the text there are promissory notes to describe “the force 
of the soul of which I will speak later on.”41 But as Hall comments, these 
constitute a rhetorical device “useful especially in emphasizing exactly what 
res extensa (the body) can do independently of res cogitans (the soul).”42 
Descartes defends a version of the soul that more resembles a transcendental 
subjectivity than it does the human personality, virtually all of which can be 
ascribed in his picture to the intricacies of physiological functioning.  
Descartes’s physiological writings, then, already contain suggestions of 
an iatric drift. But consider, second, the mechanistic materialism which 
actually did later emerge as one proposed solution to the Cartesian interaction 
problem. The most extreme manifestation of the mechanistic materialist 
tendency emerges in Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s Machine Man, which affirms 
the Cartesian approach to the body while rejecting the argument for any 
spiritual substance. In La Mettrie’s writings, the vanishingly small rational 
soul of Cartesianism finally does vanish. What is more, mechanistic 
materialism lends itself to a purely iatric understanding of healing. La Mettrie 
puts it thusly: 
The natural oscillation, a property of our machine, 
possessed by every fibre and, so to say, every fibrous 
element, is like that of a clock in that it cannot always 
function. It must be renewed as it is depleted, given 
strength when it languishes, weakened when it is 
oppressed by too much strength and vigour. That is what 
constitutes the only true medicine.43 
He polemicizes further that  
…if we compare two doctors, the best and most 
trustworthy is always, in my opinion, the one who knows 
the most about the physics or the mechanics of the human 
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body and who, forgetting the soul and all the worries which 
this figment of the imagination causes in fools and 
ignoramuses, concentrates solely on pure naturalism.44 
La Mettrie also points out that the basis for such a reductive approach is 
explicit in Descartes’s physiology: “To each different temperament there 
corresponds a different mind, character and habits. Even Galen knew this 
truth, which Descartes developed, going so far as to say that medicine alone 
could change minds and habits by changing the body.”45 
It is clear then that La Mettrie’s mechanistic materialism, which he 
derives in part from Descartes, is thoroughly iatric in its implications. But can 
we make a simple connection from the metaphor of the body as a clock, to the 
pernicious dehumanization that contemporary medical humanists like Gori 
and Del Volgo decry? While it is nowhere near decisive in establishing the 
style of something like an iatric bedside manner, the reader might find 
suggestive La Mettrie’s short and brutal description of “that woman without 
genital organs” and the manner in which he examined her. Of this 
“indefinable animal,” this “stupid” and “incomplete” woman, La Mettrie 
relates how “a tube put into the ureter could be touched through the anus, 
and a lancet pushed well into the place where the large opening always is in 
women found only fat and flesh with few vessels, which bled very little … 
however much one stimulated the seat of her absent clitoris, she experienced 
no pleasant feeling.”46 Such passages lend plausibility to Gori and Del Volgo’s 
strong claim that La Mettrie’s radicalization of the materialist schema heralds 
an age of iatrogenic injuries and illnesses – pathologies caused by the 
application of medicine itself – and in the bargain represents a total departure 
from ethics and politics.47 This departure prepares the ground for the 
consolidation of the iatric viewpoint – what Gori and Del Volgo argue is the 
great watershed of Xavier Bichat and the anatamo-clinical method in the 19th 
century48– and it echoes down into the present, particularly in reductivist 
accounts of human neuropsychology. Gori and Del Volgo claim for example 
that Jean-Pierre Changeux’s L’Homme neuronal49 is a “prolongation” of 
Machine Man.50 
The Second Cartesian Moment: Putting the Ghost into 
Language  
We thus have an interpretation of the “Cartesian moment” as a kind of 
original sin in modern medical thinking – one which renders conceptually 
possible the medicalization that worries the contemporary French medical 
humanists under discussion. I find this compelling but believe that Gori and 
Del Volgo do not tell the whole story concerning Descartes. My criticism boils 
down to the claim that their medical humanism, while essentially correct as a 
critique of medicalization, is more deeply Cartesian than it apparently knows 
(and, to the extent that it knows it, then so much the worse). This is, 
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effectively, because it buys in to Descartes’s knotting together of humanity, 
ethics and language. It is precisely this aspect of medical humanism which 
must be challenged in order to widen the scope of our moral community in at 
least two important ways.  
But first, some necessary background. Descartes’s methodological use of 
doubt in the Meditations is sufficiently corrosive, and his reconstruction of 
scientific knowledge sufficiently tenuous, as to leave serious doubts about 
sanity, the distinction between waking and dream states, and the basis of our 
knowledge of other minds. Leaving the first two problems aside, there is 
indeed evidence in his correspondence that Descartes was intrigued if not 
particularly troubled by the question of other minds. In a letter to the Marquis 
of Newcastle concerning nonhuman animals, he opines that “there are none 
of our external actions that could assure those who examine them that our 
body is not simply a machine that moves itself, but contains a soul that has 
thoughts, were it not for words and other signs made in reference to topics 
that present themselves without relation to any passion.”51 Everyday 
language use is remarkable in that, as Noam Chomsky puts it, it is 
“unbounded in scope and stimulus-free”.52In this way Descartes draws a 
strict line between humans and other animate creatures by deducing that, 
since the latter have no language thus construed, they also have no thoughts. 
Nonhuman animals fall entirely under the principle of mechanism, their cries 
being elicited in every case by passions – these being, according to Cartesian 
physiology, mechanistically explained.  
The Cartesian Gerauld de Cordemoy develops this line of thinking 
further in his Discours physique de la parole, making explicit the idea that “there 
can be no mechanistic explanation for the novelty, coherence and relevance of 
normal speech.”53As Chomsky puts it over three hundred years later in 
Cartesian Linguistics, “It is only the ability to innovate, and to do so in a way 
which is appropriate to novel situations and which yields coherent discourse, 
that provides crucial evidence” for the possession of mind according to 
Descartes and Cordemoy54 – not to mention Alan Turing, whose essentially 
Cartesian framework for resolving the problem of other minds lives on in the 
form of the “Turing test.”  And though post-Cartesian mechanists like La 
Mettrie stipulate that an extremely high level of complexity could account in 
principle for the creative aspect of everyday language use, Chomsky notes 
that this is a mere promissory note and “no serious attempt is made to show 
how this might be possible.”55 
The problem with Descartes’s argument about other minds is that he is 
making an epistemological point – that the only way of knowing if one is 
speaking to a rationally ensouled being is whether or not its speech 
performance is creative but context-appropriate – but he gives numerous 
indications of moving from there to an ontological pronouncement, i.e. that a 
being which does not speak in this way is not ensouled. The ontological claim 
does not follow; it is perfectly conceivable that a being may have a rational 
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soul even if we have no way of confirming that this is the case. But as noted, 
Descartes denies that nonhuman animals or “brutes” have souls on the 
grounds that they do not speak (on his view, in anything like a human 
language).56 The ethical implications of this lumping together of thought and 
language as concerns our treatment of nonhuman animals are clear. Though 
Descartes and Cordemoy both leave room in their visions of the moral 
community for angels, the Cartesian framework is above all one which 
elevates humankind to the pinnacle of the natural world through its unique 
possession of intelligence as evidenced not only by reason but by the creative 
aspect of everyday language use. All else in nature is mechanism and, apart 
from any concerns we might have about desecrating God’s creation, there is 
no intrinsic reason why vivisection, meat eating or arbitrary animal cruelty 
would be wrong. More troubling for Descartes should be what today some 
would call human “marginal cases” – i.e. those human individuals who are 
insufficiently cognitively developed or who have sufficient intellectual 
impairment to preclude the very high Cartesian/Chomskyan bar of creative, 
meaningful, and context-appropriate language use. As far as adult humans 
go, Descartes simply waves the existence of such marginal cases away. In the 
Discourse he claims that “there are no men so dull and so stupid (excluding 
not even the insane), that they are incapable of arranging various words 
together and of composing from them a discourse by means of which they 
might make their thoughts understood”.57 Descartes is admirable for 
otherwise evincing a wide-ranging egalitarianism in his views on human 
intelligence,58 and it is certainly possible that he never encountered any adult 
humans who lacked linguistic capacity for reasons of intellectual impairment. 
But if we take his claim at face value (questioning however the 
problematically normative words “dull,” “stupid,” and “insane”), then it is 
demonstrably false.59 Since the claim can be proven false, then according to 
Descartes’s own argument there are adult human beings without rational 
souls – which is to say, without souls at all. If he wished to maintain on the 
contrary, and in spite of such cases, that all humans are ensouled, then he 
would already have the resources to do so: he could posit the possession of a 
rational soul as a common human trait and ascribe the inability to speak or to 
understand language to a malfunctioning or insufficiently developed state of 
the physical mechanism. But this would be question-begging, since it would 
go against the grain of his argument about the existence of other minds – a 
move he is evidently not prepared to make for nonhuman animals.   
I will discuss the ethical implications of such special pleading for humans 
further in the Conclusion. For now, it will suffice to show how the Cartesian 
language-centric vision of humanity seeps into the philosophy, social 
criticism and clinical practice of major French medical humanists. Due to their 
centrality in the discussion over resistance to medicalization, Gori and Del 
Volgo will of course be paradigmatic in what follows. But to dispel the 
impression that the difficulties with medical humanism are theirs alone, and 
to bolster the idea of a “Cartesian” medical humanist constellation in France, 
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I will also briefly detail how their contemporaries Roudinesco and Ricoeur 
run into the same problems for similar reasons. 
Gori and Del Volgo 
One may find several instances in which Gori and Del Volgo baldly 
equate humanity with language and the capacity to speak. For instance, they 
invoke “l’ordre de la parole qui constitue l’humain”;60 “l’humus de la 
parole … ce qui fait l’humain”;61 and “le champ de la parole et du langage, 
champ spécifique au sujet humain.”62These claims have direct bearing on 
their understanding of psychoanalysis as the modern heir to the care of the 
self, i.e. to authentic therapeutic care.63 In the French context, where as we 
noted the talking cure of psychoanalysis and its status as healthcare are highly 
contested and politicized, it is possible for Gori and Del Volgo to make such 
bold and borderline outrageous claims as to suggest that any attack on 
psychoanalysis – which is “humaine sans conditions” – is on par with, for 
example, Sarkozy’s xenophobia concerning the immigration issue.64 But the 
linguistic cashing out of humanity also has implications for the connection 
between psychoanalysis and other forms of clinical practice. In a general way, 
Gori and Del Volgo claim that “Le médecin reconnaît que dans 
l’accomplissement du vivant, le vivant humain se spécifie par la parole, le 
médecin rejoint le psychanalyste en créant des lieux de soin qui permettent 
que par la parole adressée à l’Autre on ne souffre pas en vain.”65 In the specific 
context of her work in a respiratory clinic, Del Volgo describes her intake 
sessions as follows:  
C’est immédiatement, à partir du premier mot prononcé 
par le patient et amené par la simple question suivante: 
‘Qu’est-ce qui vous amène?’ qu’il s’ensuit un travail 
d’élaboration de plainte. En adoptant cette position, nous 
créons une offre d’écoute que les patients saisissent, la 
demande se trouvant le plus souvent créée par l’offre. 
Notons également que la surprise ainsi créée permet un 
effet de rupture dans l’enchaînement des soins et des 
examens complémentaires, propice à une ouverture vers 
‘l’inconnu’ … En fait, il s’agit de laisser le patient choisir 
librement ses propos, en somme l’amener à dire ses 
pensées, lesquelles s’avèrent inconsciemment 
déterminées … Le praticien laisse au patient la liberté de 
ses associations, il se doit, en effet, s’abstenir de toute 
intervention prescrite par une quelconque finalité à 
l’exception de celle consistant à mettre en œuvre la 
méthode psychanalytique.66 
What follows in Del Volgo’s text are vivid and suggestive descriptions of this 
method put into practice with individual patients – an enactment of medical 
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humanism not just as a trend in philosophical thought, but as a return to 
therapy at the heart of an iatric civilization.  
Roudinesco  
Élisabeth Roudinesco presents one of the more sustained and polemical 
versions of contemporary French medical humanism. She fits the basic criteria 
for inclusion in the constellation I am constructing. Like Gori and Del Volgo, 
she situates herself according to a critical departure from Descartes. Like 
them, she resists the reductionist tendency to treat the human soul as a 
thing;67 she is considerably worried by medicalization, and envisions a noble 
role for psychoanalysis in genuine, therapeutic healing.68 And just as Gori and 
Del Volgo do, she ultimately couches her political and ethical commitments 
to medicine in a vision of humanity that privileges language. Granted, 
Roudinesco’s case is complicated somewhat by the fact that she more 
systematically engages with the salutary effects of the French antihumanist 
challenge of the latter half of the 20th Century – specifically, as Foucault held, 
how psychoanalysis, linguistics and ethnology “dissolved the notion of 
man … without pretending to reconstitute man as an observable positive 
datum.”69 As such, even while defending humankind in general, she hedges 
her humanism and pays homage to the idea that humankind’s essence lies in 
difference (i.e. the kind of difference, common to forms of structuralism, that 
is constitutive of language). This in turn animates her historical study of 
perversion, which she argues is the uniquely human trait or capacity to thwart 
or defer human nature70and is a powerful source of resistance to 
medicalization.71 But since in the end, this very capacity for perversion 
presupposes what she views as the uniquely and universally human trait of 
symbolic language,72 Roudinesco’s vision of humanity belongs to the second 
Cartesian moment.  
Consider first Roudinesco’s homage to Descartes, and how she distances 
herself from him to define her adherence to psychoanalysis. Here she cleaves 
closely to the reading of Jacques Lacan:73 Descartes’s inaugural gesture, what 
makes him a precursor to psychoanalysis, but also to more pernicious 
developments, is to have posited a bifurcated rather than a unitary cogito. 
Specifically, on Lacan and Roudinesco’s reading the Cartesian subject 
contains both a rational, conscious part, and an irrational part. The latter “est 
reléguée dans la domaine de la folie,” and can rear its head whenever the passions 
hold sway.74 Note in passing that a simpler and perhaps more elegant 
interpretation of Descartes was already offered above: the cogito is in fact 
rational thought tout court, and that greater part of the human mental life 
which lies beyond it – even madness – belongs to the explanatory order of the 
body. But if we grant Roudinesco’s interpretation, Descartes prepares the 
ground for psychoanalysis in that he at least inaugurates the conceptual 
possibility of rendering madness intelligible by inserting it into a causal 
order.75 Freud’s conceptual revolution in turn, according to Roudinesco, was 
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to have effaced the Cartesian line between reason and madness, showing “que 
nous sommes à la fois rationnels et irrationnels et qu’il y a une continuité entre 
le corps et l’âme.”76 From this perspective, psychoanalysis would be the 
science that explains both reason and madness according to the same causal 
order, but without presupposing a complete physiological reduction – and 
the unconscious would be the postulate that would permit this approach.  
In the Lacanian “Return to Freud” which structures Roudinesco’s 
thought, the unconscious is treated as a language.77 Note further that 
Roudinesco is fond of making categorical statements about human beings, to 
the effect that the linguistic, symbolic unconscious is what makes humans 
distinct from animals;78 and further, that only humans can use language, and 
that all humans participate in a certain kind of symbolic experience since all 
humans can dream.79 Such statements shed light on Roudinesco’s concept of 
suffering, and the role of speech in truly therapeutic healing. In a passage that 
could easily have come from Gori and Del Volgo, she claims in connection 
with the psychic suffering caused by new reproductive technologies that 
“…seul un sujet parlant est en mésure de temoigner de la tragédie de son existence. 
Et sans doute ce privilege de la pensée réflexive, reçu en heritage par la psychanalyse, 
est-il le seul que l’homme modern puisse aujourd’hui revendiquer dans un monde 
désormais débordé par le vertige de sa propre puissance.”80 Descartes evidently still 
animates this picture, even if his conception of the cogito has been 
considerably transformed.  
It is in the attribution of the linguistic conception of the unconscious to 
humanity in general, however, that the philosophical tensions of maintaining 
a humanist position break out into the open. Notwithstanding the subtlety of 
her position with respect to Descartes, the unconscious, and language, the 
fault line for Roudinesco appears to be the inclusion problem that arises for 
any version of humanism. She admits that, empirically speaking, not all 
human beings have language – or thought, or the unconscious – in the sense 
that she evidently considers to be constitutive of the human.81 Nonetheless, 
she resolutely resists the implication that humanity admits of degrees, or that 
there is any possibility of extension of the boundaries of the moral community 
to include equal moral consideration for nonhuman animals. When 
challenged to address the possibility that there could be humans who are 
deprived of language yet nonetheless able to think, Roudinesco hedges and 
describes the conditions under which capacity for language or for thought 
itself may be lost. One may lose these abilities due to “des maladies, des 
malformations ou des anomalies cérébrales, neurologiques ou génétiques.”82 
This is a striking formulation, since it suggests that in at least some cases, one 
can “lose” capacities that one never even had, i.e. due to congenital causes. 
Indeed, Roudinesco goes on to claim that human beings without thought or 
language are nothing like animals, since unlike them, animals never had such 
capacities.83 But clearly, there are empirical cases of human beings who never 
had such capacities either. This does not lead us automatically to conclude, as 
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Roudinesco seems to fear, that there are no salient moral differences between 
severely intellectually impaired humans and nonhuman animals; it is a 
question of pointing out important, morally significant areas of overlap,84 as 
opposed to saying either that the intellectually disabled are animals, or that 
nonhuman animals are humans. But Roudinesco’s position here is an 
interesting echo of Descartes, who as we saw simply waved away the 
existence of tough empirical cases that would challenge his humanism.  
To her credit, Roudinesco recognizes that we owe basic moral duties, 
such as a duty of humane usage and non-cruelty, to nonhuman animals.85 But 
for Roudinesco these duties suggest specific norms of behavior that appear to 
be philosophically incoherent: zoophilic behavior is mistreatment, since a 
nonhuman animal cannot consent to sex with a human;86 but eating animals, 
at least so long as they are not killed painfully or raised in factory farms, is 
apparently not mistreatment (even though the nonhuman animal cannot 
consent in this case either).87 The incoherence is mitigated somewhat by 
Roudinesco’s problematic appeal to what is “natural” for human beings 
(zoophilia no; eating meat yes). But paradoxically as we saw, she builds a case 
for perversion (the deliberate flouting of human nature) as a uniquely human 
characteristic, and a source of resistance to medicalization – precisely due to 
the human capacity for symbolic language – before suggesting (with 
questionable normative force, given her account) that animal rights and 
radical animal welfare philosophies are themselves perverted, and implying 
that their proponents are perverts.88 Her contention is that animal rights and 
radical animal welfarism are perniciously perverted in that they actually 
diminish the moral standing of humans who lack reason in particular, as well 
as of humans in general – precisely, by lowering them to the level, or even 
beneath the level, of nonhuman animals.89  
Since Roudinesco is such a subtle reader of the history of philosophy and 
psychoanalysis, as well as such a keen commentator on cultural and social 
change in Europe, one is struck by the surprising crudity of her response to 
animal rights and radical animal welfarism philosophies. About the only 
things to commend are her condemnation of zoophilic behavior and her 
criticism of Peter Singer’s ambivalence on this count. Otherwise she commits 
such basic philosophical errors as a naturalistic fallacy based upon a 
misunderstanding of human biology and evolution (we are “naturally 
carnivores” – which is false, since we are, provisionally speaking as with all 
evolutionary traits, omnivores – and for her this false claim somehow 
contributes to clarifying the morality of meat-eating).90 Further, she begs the 
question by interpreting the opening of the moral community to nonhuman 
animals as an automatic diminishment of intellectually disabled humans. 
Moreover, she brazenly ignores the classic distinction between moral agents 
and moral patients that pervades animal rights/welfare literature.91 Finally, 
Roudinesco commits an ad hominem fallacy and plays fast and loose with her 
handling of the word “perversion” when she implies that those who challenge 
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her humanism are perverts, since any antihumanism or personism is, 
according to her definition, perverted (thus, on her view, quintessentially 
human – and yet, apparently, non-normative and therefore open to criticism). 
One is all the more disappointed on this score considering the great scholarly 
rigor of which she elsewhere demonstrates herself capable. Perhaps her 
reaction is best read as an exemplary demonstration of Western culture’s 
powerful resistance to challenges to human hegemony. 
Ricoeur 
Since Gori, Del Volgo and Roudinesco travel in such similar intellectual 
and professional circles,92 I risk painting a narrow, sectarian picture of 
Cartesian-influenced contemporary French medical humanism. It is therefore 
worthwhile to sketch how a more tangentially related French philosopher 
displays similar Cartesian resonances, if not an identical itinerary, in his 
medical humanism – and thereby open the way for further research. Unlike 
Gori, Del Volgo, and Roudinesco, Ricoeur had no practical expertise in 
psychoanalysis – though he was both sympathetic and deeply familiar with 
its philosophical aspects and implications, having authored a substantial 
study on Freud.93 The relation of Ricoeur’s picture to medicine was likewise 
not usually drawn as directly as is the case of the other authors I have cited. 
But on the basis of his posthumously published thoughts on suffering and 
dying, Ricoeur may be quite plausibly included in the constellation of French 
medical humanism I am reconstructing. I will first briefly outline Ricoeur’s 
humanism in general, and then explain the links to medicine and palliative 
care that he draws, before suggesting how his medical humanism shares in 
the assumptions of the second Cartesian moment.  
Ricoeur considered himself a humanist, and in general pursued a 
humanism of normal intellectual capacity. He rooted solicitude and indeed, 
the ethical in general, in a kind of mutuality, a reciprocity that for him signals 
what he calls “recognition in the strong sense”.94 For Ricoeur, this mutuality 
is nothing less than our common humanity. He posits a definition of humanity 
in terms of its capacities, played against and illuminated by the inner fragility 
that accompanies each of these as its necessary obverse. What Ricoeur calls 
“the primary foundation of humanity, in the sense of the human as opposed 
to the nonhuman”, is more specifically a set of capacities which includes “the 
capacity to say, the capacity to act, the capacity to recount” as well as the 
capacities of “imputability and promising.”95 The knotting together of 
humanity, language and ethics is here vividly on display. Ricoeur, moreover, 
explicitly references Descartes in drawing together these themes under the 
name of a “philosophical anthropology”: “The human situation between 
being and nothingness, to speak like Descartes” (i.e. the Descartes of the 
Fourth Meditation), is one of self-reflexive mediation that occurs as action.96 
What is decisive here is of course not the name of Descartes, but rather the 
construal of humanity as tied up with human capacity and activity.  
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Ricoeur is then able to make the link to medical and palliative care 
through his discussion of the distinction between pain and properly human 
suffering (notably, when discussing the case of the psychiatrist – not the 
psychoanalyst – confronted with suffering).97 Human capacity implies the 
capacity for failure; hence, human capacity connotes human fragility and 
finitude. Thus suffering, the specifically human way in which we confront our 
finitude, evokes the set of capacities that every human being (apparently) has. 
As such, it is distinct from mere pain and at the very limits of suffering, the 
dying person requires a humane, more than iatric kind of medical 
“accompaniment” – a witnessing and struggling-with the dying person that 
is characterized by comprehension and friendship in observing her 
movement of immanent transcendence.98 For Ricoeur, there is obviously a 
properly ethical dimension to the capacity to accompany that this vision 
implies.99  
Thus, like Gori, Del Volgo, and Roudinesco, Ricoeur draws ethical 
implications from the capacity to speak (and in particular, to tell a narrative 
of suffering). And like his contemporaries, Ricoeur’s picture must therefore 
answer the dilemma of inclusion and exclusion that any humanism must face. 
As a vision of humane medical and palliative care, Ricoeur’s sketch has much 
to recommend it – assuming we remember that it apparently applies not to 
human beings in general, but to human persons of normal intellectual 
capacity.  
Conclusion: Troubling Humanism   
To summarize the argument thus far, there is a stream of medical 
humanism in contemporary French thought, the broad outlines of which can 
be traced back to Descartes. This Cartesian heritage is complicated however, 
since a) the exemplars of this humanism explicitly define themselves against 
the Cartesian moment, or rather more specifically against the pernicious 
medicalization which they argue the latter renders possible; but b) the 
substance of their resistance to medicalization is itself profoundly Cartesian, 
at least to the extent that like Descartes, they advance a definition of humanity 
as something that depends upon language (or more specifically, the creative 
aspect of ordinary human speech). At a minimum, this interpretation of the 
contemporary French scene should caution against simplistic and brutal 
summations of Descartes's contributions to modern thought; to the extent that 
my own argument paints in similarly broad brush strokes, it also invites us to 
deepen our understanding of the present by revisiting Descartes as a complex 
foundational thinker. But while I have already sketched how the anti-
medicalization literature analyzes the mechanistic and iatric aspects of 
the Cartesian heritage, it remains to be seen whether the other major Cartesian 
bequeathal - the definition of humanity couched in ordinary speech – may be 
similarly troubled. It is to this question that I turn in what follows. 
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In the first place, there should be no doubt about the potential of the 
creative linguistic definition of humanity to resist medicalization. The return 
to true therapy conceived and to some extent clinically practiced by Gori and 
Del Volgo and their contemporaries is, after all, a latter-day manifestation of 
the Freudian resistance to reductionist, Krapelian psychiatry. "L'instant de 
dire," however it is construed, broadly resists the pressure to save time, and 
its practice insists upon the individual narrative of suffering, including rather 
than pruning away that part of suffering which is intractable to technical 
reason. From the perspective of a resister to the hegemony of the economic 
genre, I can only applaud this general orientation. But I stop short in my 
endorsement of terms like "humane", "humanizing" and the like when 
describing this call for a therapeutic return. It is, in other words, possible and 
as I will argue necessary to affirm a return to true therapy while rejecting its 
humanist baggage. 
French medical humanism that grounds itself in the second Cartesian 
moment faces the same basic dilemma as any humanism: specifically, the 
dilemma of whether to include or exclude so-called “marginal” human cases. 
While it is no surprise that humanisms tend to exclude nonhuman animals 
from the moral community, it is perhaps less obvious that they also raise a 
serious dilemma for the person who wishes to defend and include human 
beings with severe intellectual disabilities. Humanists typically evoke 
supposedly specifically human capacities such as reason, language, creativity 
and the achievements which flow therefrom as sources of inherent value and 
dignity. But as we have noted, there are empirical cases of human beings who 
do not possess these capacities, or who possess them in a highly divergent if 
not severely restricted form. So the humanist faces a dilemma. It could be, on 
the one hand, that her humanism is to be taken literally, in the sense that 
human beings really are included in the moral community by virtue of their 
capacities. In this case she would have to either beg the question by ascribing 
such capacities to human beings who don’t seem to have them, or admit that 
at least some human beings technically don’t seem to qualify as human (this 
was, precisely, the issue discussed above, in connection to Descartes and his 
difficulties with the problem of other minds). But suppose, on the other hand, 
that we don’t take the humanist’s emphasis on capacities literally. In that case, 
human beings lacking in capacity or possessing different capacities could be 
included as honorary members of the moral community if we stipulate that 
what really matters is one’s belonging to the human species. The turn to 
species membership would solve the problem of ableism generated by 
couching humanity in capacity, but at the price of grounding moral standing 
in a philosophically arbitrary and seemingly morally irrelevant criterion.100 
Moreover, the philosophical implications of doing so would seem to include 
politically problematic and difficult-to-defend positions like a ban on early 
abortions or even, perhaps, on emergency contraceptive measures. In short, 
humanism is caught between an inclusiveness and an exclusiveness that are 
both problematic and it would perhaps be more fruitful to remove the 
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qualifier “human” from discussion of rights to healthcare and moral 
consideration. 
Thus, in Gori and Del Volgo's case, the creative linguistic definition of 
humanity and the insistence that language is the locus of both ethics and 
of suffering imply three prima facie absurd conclusions about certain classes of 
biologically human individuals, at least if we take them at their word: a) that 
marginal human persons, for example infants or people with Severe 
Intellectual Disabilities (SIDs), are not human, since they lack or display 
a severely limited or nonexistent range of the creative aspect of language 
use; b) that such individuals do not suffer, properly speaking, since their pain 
and distress cannot or can only in a limited way be put into narrative 
language; and c) that such individuals do not stand in an "ethical" relation to 
the medical practitioner, since ethics is couched in a narrowly linguistic 
understanding of the encounter with the other. As Eva Feder Kittay has 
elegantly shown in her book Love's Labor, there is ample reason to reject all 
three conclusions and to extend the range of the human moral community to 
cases that have been traditionally classified as below the threshold of 
inclusion. But for reasons of philosophical parity concerning moral 
standing, broader inclusion would have to be conceived on the basis of a 
shared minimum degree of personhood or subjectivity - what Tom Regan 
called being "the experiencing subject of a life"101 – rather than the arbitrary 
criterion of shared species membership. This points to the other troubling 
aspect of contemporary medical humanism. Surely nonhuman animals are 
also ensnared in the logic of technical reason, and surely nonhuman animals 
suffer (in a looser sense of the word than they would apparently allow). 
Moreover, some of those animals are already integral parts of our 
communities, whether we recognize the full ethical import of this fact or 
not.102 But since according to Gori and Del Volgo and their contemporaries, 
the soul of suffering lies in narrative, and that of ethics in the creative 
linguistic encounter, nonhuman animals do not appear on their medical 
humanism's radar (or like Roudinesco, they appear in order for her to 
rehearse a litany of fallacious arguments). It isn't enough to make special 
allowances in our humanism for “marginal” human cases; stopping there 
would be philosophically indefensible and arbitrary. Paradoxically, we need 
a "humanism" – better yet, a "personism" – that would include such human 
cases but also extend beyond our species to other sentient animals. The 
Cartesian stream of contemporary French medical humanism offers no 
indications in this direction.  
We must grant of course that Gori and Del Volgo, for example, are 
offering a perfectly plausible approach for some if not most human therapeutic 
cases. Moreover, none of what I have said implies that they would be 
personally unmoved by “marginal” human and nonhuman cases of illness, 
pain and suffering. A judgment of their character or their motivations is not 
at issue, but rather an attempt to draw out the philosophical implications of 
M a t t h e w  R .  M c L e n n a n  |  5 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 1 (2018)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.809 
their arguments and their rhetoric. This is nothing more than an instance 
of their own historical and critical method, turned back on them. What it 
reveals is that we have not stepped out from the shadow of a second Cartesian 
moment, one that locates the humanity of humans in the 
creative encounter of ordinary speech. Even though French medical 
humanists have correctly identified medicalization as a major problem of our 
time, the idea of humanity that is explicit in their criticisms cannot possibly be 
taken literally, since it implicitly excludes or lowers the moral status of certain 
classes of humans, and it does not seriously consider nonhuman persons. 
Therefore, if we wish not to dismiss their work as a rhetorical exercise, then 
we must radicalize their approach. Just as the point of contemporary French 
medical humanism is to recover the therapeutic from the dominance of the 
iatric, we must insist upon the recovery of the therapeutic from the dominance 
of humanism. 
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